AM Sets Eastside Express Underwriting at $200–$300 Million Over 2–3 Years

AM’s expected underwriting/contracting structure for Eastside Express—and implications for third-party business beyond Antero Resources

1) What AM is expecting for Eastside Express’s underwriting and contracting structure

A. “AR underwriting” is the core basis, with an explicit scale and timeline

AM described Eastside Express as “really AR underwriting” with a total economic basis of $200 million to $300 million over the next 2 to 3 years (i.e., ~$100 million per year). ¹

B. Interconnect and capacity framing: 7 long-haul interconnects and 1.5–2 Bcf/day

AM said Eastside Express will have “7 interconnects with long-haul pipelines” and that the project involves a “Big pipe, 1.5 to 2 Bcf a day.” ¹

C. Contracting posture: positioned for optionality, but (initially) underwritten by AR development plans

AM stated that opportunities will exist, but “solely underwritten by Antero Resources and its development plans,” while also having “optionality to get third-party business and connect with all those different pipes.” ¹

Management also emphasized that AM is building Eastside Express “knowing Antero’s development and where the interconnects are” and wants to be positioned so that, when opportunities arise, AM can deliver gas to them. ²

D. Tenor/expected AR contract duration is at least “’27 and beyond”

In response to timing-related contracting questions, AM indicated: “not in ’26, but ’27 and beyond.” ³
While the excerpt does not explicitly name contract years, it supports that the relevant underwriting/contracting effects (for the Eastside Express structure being discussed) are expected to meaningfully show up starting in 2027 and beyond. ³

E. AR acreage dedication: 1 million acres dedicated to AM

AM stated it has “1 million acres dedicated to us from AR.” ⁴ AM further tied this to routing/contracting behavior by stating that because AM knows where AR drills and where the plants are drilling, “there’s no need for those MVCs because we know the volumes will be there.” ⁵

F. Volumetric commitment mechanics: “no need for MVCs” (implied reduced volumetric risk where AR volumes are known)

AM’s point about avoiding MVCs is important for “structure”: it implies the base contracting structure can rely on expected AR volumes without the need for minimum volume commitments that would otherwise shift volumetric exposure onto AM. ⁵
However, the excerpts do not explicitly label the Eastside Express take-or-pay vs volumetric-exposure terms in numeric form; AM did not provide the exact answer in the transcript excerpt where this was asked. ⁶

2) How that structure could enable or limit third-party business beyond Antero Resources

A. Why the structure can enable third-party business

1) Physical optionality: multiple interconnect paths to third-party markets

The project’s 7 long-haul interconnects and 1.5–2 Bcf/day scale create geographic and offtake flexibility that can be used by parties beyond AR once counterparties are ready to contract. ¹
AM explicitly said this creates “optionality to get third-party business and connect with all those different pipes.” ¹

2) Market-build positioning ahead of demand projects

AM framed Eastside Express as a “phase in” project aligned with when new market opportunities arise, with the objective of “increasing optionality and supporting low-cost dry gas growth.” ⁷
That “phase-in as opportunities arise” concept is consistent with enabling third-party offtake contracting—because the infrastructure is being built to meet emerging demand. ⁷

3) Demand project presence within AR’s acreage supports expansion beyond AR volumes over time

AM emphasized it is the “builder” with demand projects/power plants within or close to its dedicated acreage, and stated it would build pipelines and laterals to those projects. ⁴
Even though AM described the volume certainty in terms of AR, the same regional demand build-out creates a pathway for contracting with non-AR demand entities (power producers, data centers, other gas buyers), if/when those parties contract for supply. ⁴

B. Why the structure could limit third-party business (at least initially)

1) Underwriting is described as “solely” AR development plans

AM explicitly characterized the underwriting baseline as “solely underwritten by Antero Resources and its development plans.” ¹
That wording suggests third-party business may be incremental rather than a primary underwriting foundation during the early phase.

2) Contracting intent appears to rely on “known volumes” (via AR acreage and drilling visibility)

AM stated that because it knows where AR drills and where plants are located, it can avoid MVCs: “there’s no need for those MVCs because we know the volumes will be there.” ⁵
This implies the early economics and utilization profile are anchored in AR; third-party volumes would likely be secondary rather than required to support the base project cash flows.

3) Management indicates AR is the most probable source of contracted gas relative to a broader project backlog

In discussing a broader set of projects (not Eastside Express specifically), AM said it is “way more comfortable with AR as a supplier,” that AR is “most likely” associated with its pipeline projects, and that AR is “probably half” of a 15-project list. ⁸
This supports a view that while third-party opportunities may exist, the near-term contracting landscape is still expected to be dominated by AR. ⁸

3) Putting it together: a practical interpretation of the structure and its third-party impact

Based on AM’s own description, the Eastside Express approach can be summarized as:

• Base underwriting/cash-flow foundation: AR underwriting of a $200–$300 million scope over 2–3 years (about $100 million/year), linked to AR development plans. ¹
• Infrastructure scale and access: a 1.5–2 Bcf/day “big pipe” with 7 long-haul interconnects, providing the physical pathways for third-party offtakers to connect. ¹
• Dedication/volume certainty mechanism: 1 million acres dedicated to AM, and reliance on knowing AR drilling and plant locations to avoid MVC-type commitments (“no need for those MVCs”). ⁴⁵
• Third-party business implication: AM is positioning for optional third-party contracting, but the early economics are not presented as independently underwritten by third parties—they are “solely underwritten” by AR, with third-party demand access enabled by connectivity and optionality. ¹

In short, the structure is designed to reduce early underwriting/volume risk through AR dedication and known volumes (and to avoid MVCs), while still creating multiple interconnect-based pathways that could allow AM to capture incremental third-party business once counterparties show up. ¹⁴⁵