Edison International Delineates Financeable Wildfire Funding Scenarios and Q3 Uncertainty in Q2 2026 Transcript

Wildfire finance “on the table”: scenarios/components, securitization & upfront contributions, and Q3 plan issuance likelihood (Edison/SCE excerpts)

1) What components/scenarios are being considered for a financeable wildfire funding solution?

Management frames the problem as a broader state issue with cross-economy impacts and uncertainty in Sacramento, explicitly noting they do not yet have the “language” or a “complete answer.” ¹²³⁴

Within that constraint, the specific “components” and “scenarios” that management indicates are on the table fall into three buckets:

A. A durable statewide framework (i.e., predictability) that supports lower-cost capital

Management argues that clarity/quality of the legislative outcome will affect the cost of capital available for future investment, and that a “durable and financeable framework” supports access to lower-cost capital and affordability. ⁵⁴ Conversely, a framework “without sufficient predictability” increases Edison/SCE financing costs and makes SCE’s investments more expensive. ⁵

They also emphasize a near-term credit risk scenario if reform is not credit-supportive (they reference potential credit rating downgrades and the downstream effect on cost of debt passed to customers). ⁶

Implied scenario set:

• Reform passes with credit-supportive predictability: potentially lower financing costs and continued investment pace. ⁵⁶
• Reform delays/partial outcome / unclear predictability: potentially higher financing costs (via equity cost of capital and/or debt costs), requiring re-prioritization. ³⁵⁶

B. Partial or staggered solutions over multiple years

Management explicitly says there is a possibility of no complete answer and instead:

• “a partial answer”
• “some work done in 2026”
• “some work left for 2027” (with a new governor/legislators). ³

This sets a timeline scenario rather than a single-bill “all at once” solution. ³

C. Utility-side choices for future investments: securitization vs upfront contributions vs “benefit-cost lens”

The question posed to management (and management’s response framing) indicates scenarios including:

• future securitization of capital
• upfront contributions
• other utility-side actions that would be evaluated as part of the overarching financeable solution. ¹³

Management’s response focuses on how they would weigh such mechanisms given uncertainty:

• they would avoid making negative NPV decisions for investors if market/equity cost of capital changes significantly due to the legislative outcome. ³
• they also must uphold PUC safety/reliability obligations. ³
• management states it is not yet providing “specific” reaction details because they are still waiting for what happens (and will reassess once the August 31 / September 1 period begins). ³⁷

So, while securitization/upfront contributions are explicitly discussed as part of the “weighing things” prompt, the actionable “on-the-table” plan is not fully specified yet—rather, management signals the decision framework depends heavily on legislative content and capital market reaction. ¹³⁷

2) Could a new wildfire plan be issued in Q3 given ongoing GRC visibility?

A. Management indicates they are in a position of strong visibility for the current GRC—through 2028—and no equity need through 2030

Management says SCE has a GRC “in hand” that is approved, with “line of sight visibility through 2028.” ² They further state capital spending can execute “without any equity needs,” and they “still do not see a need for equity through that 2030 time period,” while guidance has been extended for 2029–2030 directionally. ²

This matters for “can a new plan be issued” because it implies near-term capital execution does not hinge on new legislation for equity funding within the already-approved GRC window. ²

B. But issuance of a new (post-legislation) wildfire funding plan depends on Sacramento language and market reaction; they do not commit to timing

Management explicitly does not know what will happen in Sacramento and has not seen legislative language yet. ² They also say it is “hard to … say” what reaction/action might be without understanding the legislative answer (including whether they see a complete or partial solution and what content it contains). ³

They give a clear process/timing anchor:

• “as of August 31st,” “September 1st … later that night,” they would start working on implications and whether any near-term actions are needed, and they will “keep you all posted.” ³

That language supports the idea that implications/actions could be evaluated going into/around Q3, but management does not commit that a new plan will be issued in Q3; instead they stress uncertainty and the need to be thoughtful. ³⁷

Bottom line on Q3 issuance likelihood (based on excerpts)

• They have visibility and capital execution confidence within the existing approved GRC through 2028 and do not foresee equity needs through 2030, reducing urgency for an immediate “new plan” from a financing standpoint. ²
• However, they have not yet seen legislative language and do not give a definitive “yes” that a new wildfire funding plan would be issued in Q3; actions depend on what legislators enact and how that changes the inherent cost of equity. ²³⁷

Therefore, the most supported conclusion is: a Q3 issuance is not ruled out as “implications work” begins around late August/September, but management does not confirm a new plan will be issued in Q3; the commitment level is intentionally conditional. ³⁷

3) How securitization and upfront contributions show up in the wildfire context in these excerpts?

Even beyond the legislative “financeable solution,” there are two relevant data points indicating Edison/SCE is already operating with mechanisms that resemble capital-market funding/resolution:

A. SCE completed a securitization earlier this week for Woolsey Fire cost recovery

Management states SCE “successfully completed the Woolsey Fire cost recovery securitization,” generating “approximately $2 billion in proceeds,” which will be used to recover claims/other costs including retiring related debt. ⁸

This is direct evidence that securitization is already an implemented tool in their wildfire claims cost recovery machinery (at least for a prior wildfire). ⁸

B. Wildfire Fund claims: crossing $1B threshold and using a prefunding mechanism to avoid out-of-pocket cash

Separately from future legislation, management discusses timing to access reimbursement through the Wildfire Fund mechanism:

• they state they are crossing a “$1 billion threshold” via subrogation settlements and WRCP settlements. ⁹
• they also state they “worked out with the CEA … prefunding mechanism so that we do not come out of pocket” and are “working through … to fund the claims now.” ⁹

They also earlier note their work to cross the $1 billion threshold and timing for first filings to tap the wildfire fund reimbursement. ¹⁰

Interpretation: While this is not “new legislative funding,” it indicates the operational pathway currently includes prefunding/reimbursement mechanics and that management is actively engaging with the administrator (CEA) to fund claims without immediate out-of-pocket impacts. ¹⁰⁹

4) Risk/mitigation program pipeline (GRC/RAMP) provides ongoing structure—supporting why “plan issuance” might not be urgent

Management describes an ongoing, regulator-driven pipeline for wildfire mitigation investments through the next RAMP/GRC process:

• they say SCE filed its RAMP application in May, including wildfire mitigation, cybersecurity, climate adaptation, and safety measures. ⁵
• they indicate investments identified in past RAMP filings accounted for about one-third of total capital requested in the GRC. ⁵
• they provide quantitative preliminary estimates in the ramp application for 2029–2032: about “450 miles of covered conductor” and “approximately 190-miles of targeted undergrounding.” ¹¹
• they also report progress since January 2025: “about 800 miles of covered conductor” and “about 90 miles of undergrounding” including all rebuild areas, and no covered conductor failure associated with mitigated risks. ¹¹

This supports the view that wildfire risk mitigation capital planning is already governed by a regulatory workflow (GRC/RAMP) independent of “issuing a new plan” in Q3, even though legislative reforms affect financing/capital costs and wildfire funding/claims frameworks. ²⁵¹¹

Conclusion

• Scenarios/components on the table: management’s excerpts support a range of legislative outcomes from a durable, credit-supportive statewide framework (supporting lower-cost capital) to partial/staggered reforms (work in 2026 and remaining work in 2027), with utility-side decisions balancing “future securitization” and “upfront contributions” using a disciplined NPV/benefit-cost lens while safeguarding PUC safety/reliability obligations. ¹²³⁵³⁶
• Securitization/upfront contributions evidence: SCE has already used wildfire cost recovery securitization (Woolsey Fire) generating about $2B proceeds, and claims funding currently involves crossing $1B thresholds and using a Wildfire Fund prefunding mechanism to avoid out-of-pocket cash while funding claims. ⁸¹⁰⁹
• Q3 new plan issuance: management does not confirm that a new wildfire plan will be issued in Q3. They emphasize uncertainty in Sacramento and say they will begin evaluating implications around August 31/September 1, while also noting they already have GRC visibility through 2028 and do not foresee equity needs through 2030—reducing the operational pressure to issue a brand-new plan immediately. ²³⁷