Eversource Energy’s PURA rate-case posture in 2026 election year signals rigorous regulator scrutiny

Assessment of PURA’s approach to a large rate-case filing in an election year (stakeholder awareness, potential surprise, and confidence in appropriate action)

1) What the record suggests about PURA’s posture when a large case hits in an election year

From the transcript, management frames PURA as highly engaged and actively questioning in recent matters—specifically pointing to “the past 6 months of decisions” including “around Yankee” and “storm cost recovery,” and emphasizing that “All 5 of them are on the bench” and “asking very good questions.” ¹ That depiction is important context for how regulators approach a major rate filing: rather than treating the matter as a “set-and-forget” process, management is signaling that PURA is conducting a substantive review.

Management also explicitly acknowledges the political calendar: “keep in mind, as I tell folks, it is an election year” (in both Massachusetts and Connecticut). ¹ However, the same statement pivots back to substance: management’s confidence is based on PURA being “very engaged,” and on the historic quality of questioning and the expectation of a “fair hearing” and “prudent” spending review. ¹

Assessment: Based on the excerpt, management’s view of PURA’s approach is that election-year timing does not appear (in their experience) to soften regulatory rigor. Instead, they believe PURA’s engagement level remains high and fact-driven. ¹

2) How informed stakeholders were prefiling (and what evidence exists in the excerpt)

The excerpt does not directly provide evidence about how much stakeholders were informed before the filing date (e.g., whether PURA conducted pre-stakeholder hearings or whether intervenors received draft positions). It does, however, provide two indirect indicators that stakeholders likely had meaningful awareness of the filing’s shape:

1. The filing content appears to reflect prior stakeholder/policymaker work. Management states that certain rate-design elements (notably “economic development and heat pump rates”) were “designed after years of working closely with Connecticut stakeholders and policymakers.” ² That implies at least part of the proposal was not developed in a vacuum immediately before filing. ²

2. There were already major regulatory structures and earlier proceedings that inform what stakeholders would expect. Management describes the Connecticut CL&P request as the first general rate request since 2017 with a $451 million revenue deficiency. ³ That suggests stakeholders were operating against a known baseline and long gap, making the eventual filing’s magnitude less likely to be entirely unexpected in direction if not in exact number. ³

Assessment: The excerpt supports that stakeholders likely had visibility into at least some components (policy-aligned rate design) and had historical context (no general rate request since 2017). ^{2 3} But the excerpt does not document whether stakeholders were informed about the full “large rate-case filing” specifics prefiling (e.g., full deficiency drivers, financing assumptions, or regulatory strategy).

3) Were stakeholders surprised?

The transcript contains management’s perception questions rather than management’s confirmation of surprise. The question being addressed is essentially: “Were they surprised?” ⁴—but management does not answer “yes” or “no” in the excerpt. Instead, management responds with confidence centered on regulatory engagement and the substance of the record (cost controls, reliability metrics, and the composition of the revenue deficiency).

Key points management emphasizes that typically reduce “surprise” risk from a regulator’s perspective:

• Management says they have not filed a distribution rate change since 2017 and highlights reliability and investments in Connecticut. ¹
• Management provides the deficiency composition: only 11% of the deficiency is “coming from O&M,” and the other 90% is related to “CapEx, resiliency, taxes, depreciation.” ¹
• Management argues cost control seriousness by noting the “commitment” and that the filing shows investments are tied to safety/reliability/state policy goals “in the most efficient and cost effective way.” ²

Assessment: The excerpt does not establish that stakeholders were surprised. What it does establish is that, in the narrative management offers, the filing is positioned as (a) long-overdue given the time since 2017 and (b) largely driven by non-optional, system-preserving items (CapEx/resiliency/taxes/depreciation) with a limited O&M portion—elements that are the kinds of facts parties can scrutinize rather than an unknown “black box.” ^{1 2 3}

4) What gives management confidence regulators will act appropriately (and how strong that evidence is)

Management’s “confidence” rationale in the excerpt is built on three pillars:

A. PURA’s process quality and engagement

Management cites recent PURA decisions and characterizes PURA as “very engaged,” with “All 5… on the bench” and “asking very good questions.” ¹ They conclude this will lead to a “fair hearing” and that regulators will find the requested funds “prudent.” ¹

Strength of evidence in excerpt: This is qualitative, but it is directly asserted and grounded in cited examples of PURA activity over the prior six months. ¹

B. The case record is framed as cost-controlled and reliability-positive

Management emphasizes cost controls and reliability, including:

• 11% O&M vs ~90% non-O&M deficiency components (CapEx/resiliency/taxes/depreciation). ¹
• A specific cost-control framing: “about $45 million in expenses that have been avoided for our customers” compared with inflation. ²
• They “only include things in our forecast” with a “high degree of conviction,” and they add they “have not recognized $1” of retroactive carrying charges. ⁵ (This speaks to forecast discipline and may influence prudence assessments.)

Strength of evidence in excerpt: Again, qualitative, but with specific percentages and a concrete avoided-expense figure. ^{1 2 5}

C. Existing evidence of regulatory “decision-making” in relevant domains

Management highlights “storm cost recovery” as one of the areas where PURA has been actively engaged and making decisions in the prior six months. ¹ They also discuss that PURA’s “final storm cost decision” approved ~$870 million out of ~$975 million requested, and details related deferrals/exclusions and timing of securitization steps. ⁶

Why this matters to the election-year question: It provides a concrete example (storm cost recovery) that PURA is both responsive and willing to refine outcomes relative to utility requests—even if management was “a bit disappointed” on certain items. ^{5 6}

Strength of evidence in excerpt: High for the “regulators will act” portion, because it reports a specific PURA decision outcome and subsequent regulatory steps. ^{6 5}

5) Bottom-line assessment

• Approach in an election year: The excerpt portrays PURA as consistently engaged and substantively active, even while acknowledging election-year context. ¹
• Stakeholder prefiling awareness: The transcript does not directly quantify stakeholder awareness prefiling, but indicates stakeholders had prior exposure to at least certain proposal elements (e.g., policy-aligned rate design after years of work) and contextual expectations (e.g., first CL&P general rate request since 2017). ^{2 3}
• Surprise: The excerpt does not confirm whether stakeholders were surprised. It instead emphasizes that the filing’s deficiency is largely non-O&M-driven (capex/resiliency/taxes/depreciation), which is the type of detail that reduces “surprise” and enables fact-based scrutiny. ^{1 2}
• Confidence in appropriate regulatory action: The strongest support in the excerpts is the combination of (i) qualitative but specific claims about PURA engagement (“All 5…asking very good questions”), ¹ and (ii) a concrete example of PURA’s decision-making in storm cost recovery with quantified approve/deferral amounts and procedural next steps for securitization. ^{6 1}

Overall, based strictly on the excerpted record, management’s confidence is not presented as blind optimism about politics; it is presented as a belief grounded in process engagement and observed regulatory outcomes in recent, similar proceedings. ^{1 6}