Dollar General's Targeted Promotions and Trade-In Drive 1.4% Traffic, 2% Sales in Q1 2026

How the promotional approach interacted with accelerated trade-in to produce +1.4% customer traffic and +2% same-store sales (comp)

1) The “targeted vs. widespread” promo strategy was designed to pull demand forward specifically from value-seeking shoppers and trading customers

Management emphasized that Dollar General’s promotional activity “increased during the quarter” but remained “very targeted” (not widespread), and was described as proactive rather than reactive. ¹² The operating logic was that promos were used to support store traffic by reinforcing the company’s value positioning “where we promote, how we promote, and the value that we are showing.” ¹²

This matters because the quarter’s performance occurred in an environment where “the consumer is definitely looking for value… all cohorts,” and the company explicitly tied the expectation of promotions to “promote that traffic that we all look for.” ¹

Interaction mechanism:

• Targeted promos focused on where value sensitivity would convert into incremental store visits (traffic), rather than broad-based discounting that might not convert well across all customer segments. ²
• Those promos worked in tandem with the company’s everyday price architecture—management repeatedly described everyday pricing and the $1 price point as the “anchor” for value. ¹³
• As a result, the promotional cadence supported incremental traffic rather than relying on widespread promotional breadth. ¹²

2) Accelerated trade-in (especially at the higher end) amplified the promo-to-traffic conversion

Management linked trade-in acceleration to the value equation and to affordability pressure. They discussed “accelerated rate of trade in” and noted that “all cohorts are trading in,” with the upper end trading in most, specifically calling out the “100k+” cohort. ⁴

They also contextualized the drivers as sustained household budget pressure (including inflation and elevated fuel prices, and history repeating when fuel inflation persists). ⁴

At the same time, management described promos as targeted not only for the “low end consumer,” but also for “retention for that trade in customer,” including instances where the company is “marketing to her specifically.” ⁵²

Interaction mechanism:

• Trade-in acceleration created a larger pool of shoppers willing to switch toward value retailers. ⁴
• Targeted promos were positioned to capture and retain those trading customers, improving the likelihood that value-oriented shoppers would translate into visits (traffic). ⁵²
• Because promos were planned around segment/value needs and anchored by everyday pricing, the incremental conversion effect could be stronger than if promotions had been widespread but less precisely matched to trading behavior. ²³

3) The outcome: the comp was driven primarily by traffic (+1.4%), with basket lift playing a smaller role

Dollar General reported that same-store sales increased 2%, “primarily driven by customer traffic growth of 1.4%,” and supported by average basket growth of 0.5 point. ⁶

Management also stated the company achieved “a nice job balancing consumables and non consumables,” with category tailwinds that continued into the quarter (and indicated nonconsumables were especially strong). ¹⁶ But the key point for your question is the explicit decomposition: traffic was the primary driver of the 2% comp. ⁶

Additionally, management indicated they were “very proud of that 1.4% traffic gain in the quarter” and connected the cadence of promotional activity (“layered in”) to the goal of driving traffic. ¹

Interaction mechanism:

• Targeted promotional activity was intended to drive traffic. ¹²
• Accelerated trade-in increased the responsiveness of customers to value/price cues and drove incremental store visits. ⁴⁵
• Together, these produced +1.4% traffic, which in turn drove +2% same-store sales, with basket growth contributing but not dominating. ⁶

4) The $1 “value engine” helped ensure promos converted into repeatable visits (not just one-off buying)

The excerpts repeatedly frame the $1 price point as central: management called out the $1 price point as an “anchor” to everyday pricing and as a “real savior,” resonating with both core customers and trading customers. ¹⁵

They also quantified the Value Valley initiative: more than 500 rotating items all at $1, which outperformed the chain average in Q1 with a comp sales increase of 18.4%. ⁷ That is evidence that the value mechanism behind targeted promotions was strong enough to generate substantial category-level momentum during the period when traffic and comp were positive. ⁷⁶

They further described the role of $1 items as both an “add on to the basket” earlier in the month and as a “bridge” to help customers “balance her budget at the end of the month.” ³ That dual timing aligns well with retention goals for trading customers—consistent with management’s view that promotions were designed for retention of the trade-in customer. ⁵³

Interaction mechanism:

• Accelerated trade-in made shoppers more value-sensitive and more likely to engage with $1 offers. ⁴⁵
• Targeted promos then concentrated incentives where this value sensitivity would convert into visits and purchases—reinforced by the demonstrated strength of Value Valley ($1 items). ⁷¹²
• The result was a comp pattern dominated by traffic, not just basket inflation. ⁶

5) Putting it together (cause-and-effect chain consistent with management’s framing)

1. Trade-in accelerated across cohorts, with the upper-income cohort trading in most, amid affordability pressure. ⁴
2. Dollar General responded with value-led, $1-anchored merchandising and described promo activity as very targeted, proactive, and not widespread, including targeting/retention of trading customers. ¹²⁵
3. The promo + trade-in interaction showed up primarily as customer traffic growth of 1.4%, which was the “primary” driver of 2% same-store sales growth, with basket adding support (+0.5 point). ⁶

Bottom line

Dollar General’s promotional approach appears to have worked by precision: keeping promotions targeted (not widespread) and anchored in the everyday/value and $1 framework was positioned to convert a broader, accelerating population of trading shoppers into incremental store visits. ¹²⁵⁴ That conversion is reflected directly in the reported comp math: +1.4% traffic was the primary driver of +2% same-store sales, with average basket growth contributing 0.5 point. ⁶